In recent years, there has been growing academic interest in the relationship between bioethics and human rights. Much of this work has proposed that the normative and institutional framework of human rights can be usefully applied to address those bioethical controversies that are global in scope: in particular, the genetic modification of human beings and issues of access to health care. In response, a number of critics called for some caution in the application of human rights to such controversies. In particular, they argued that human rights raise unresolved distributional and fundamental issues. Interestingly, however, some of these critics went on to suggest that it might be possible to invoke some bioethical insights to address these human rights concerns. This article assesses these recent attempts to apply insights from bioethics to human rights theory and practice. It argues that while these insights do not represent an entirely new and original contribution to human rights thinking, they force human rights scholars and activists to reflect on some key issues. First of all, they force us to question the common idea that human rights are always 'inviolable assets'. Secondly, they demand that we pay close attention to the 'integrity' of the institutions we entrust with determining our specific rights. Finally, and perhaps most radically, these insights challenge the view that human rights accrue only to members of the human species. He argues that while these insights do not represent an entirely new and original contribution to human rights thinking, they force human rights scholars and activists to reflect on some key issues. First of all, they force us to question the common idea that human rights are always 'inviolable assets'. Secondly, they demand that we pay close attention to the 'integrity' of the institutions we entrust with determining our specific rights. Finally, and perhaps most radically, these insights challenge the view that human rights accrue only to members of the human species. He argues that although these insights
do not represent an entirely new and original contribution to human rights thinking, they force human rights scholars and activists to reflect on some key issues. First of all, they force us to question the common idea that human rights are always 'inviolable assets'. Secondly, they demand that we pay close attention to the 'integrity' of the institutions we entrust with determining our specific rights. Finally, and perhaps most radically, these insights challenge the notion that human rights accrue only to members of the human species. they demand that we pay close attention to the 'integrity' of the institutions to which we entrust the determination of our specific rights. Finally, and perhaps most radically, these insights challenge the view that human rights accrue only to members of the human species. they demand that we pay close attention to the 'integrity' of the institutions to which we entrust the determination of our specific rights. Finally, and perhaps most radically, these insights challenge the view that human rights accrue only to members of the human species.